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Abstract 
Peer-to-peer (P2P) networks have become popular as a new 
paradigm for information exchange and are being used in many 
applications such as file sharing, distributed computing, video 
conference, VoIP, radio and TV broadcasting. This popularity 
comes with security implications and vulnerabilities that need to 
be addressed. Especially, due to direct communication between 
two end nodes in P2P networks, these networks are potentially 
vulnerable to “Man-in-the-Middle” attacks. 
 
In this paper, we propose a new public-key cryptosystem for P2P 
networks that is robust against Man-in-the-Middle adversary. 
This cryptosystem is based on RSA and knapsack problems. Our 
precoding-based algorithm uses knapsack problem to perform a 
permutation and pads random data to the message. We show that 
comparing to other proposed cryptosystems, our algorithm is 
more efficient and it is fully secure against an active adversary. 
 
Keywords: P2P networks, Man-in-the-Middle Attack, RSA and 
knapsack problems, IND-CCA2. 
1. Introduction 
The popularity of information technologies is increasing 
significantly. Increased usage of these technologies will 
cause to a huge increment in the number of users. This 
results in lack of sufficient servers in client-server 
configurations in spite of having a large enough 
bandwidth. Moreover, the data that is needed by the client 
may not be available on the servers that are connected to 
it. To address this problem, an alternative to traditional 
client-server configurations is introduced, which is called 
Peer-to-Peer (P2P) network.  A P2P network is a group of 
computer nodes, which construct their own open 
unrestricted sharing networks on top of the Internet 
architecture. P2P technology is widely used in file sharing 
protocols such as BitTorrent and Dropbox, as well as in 
instance message communication systems such as Skype. 
The P2P system has reached to the fourth generation. This 
generation applies decentralized servers in the network. In 
fact each device is classified as a peer and simultaneously 
it may be a client or server peer. The fourth generation 
also supports streams over P2P networks. The success of 
P2P networks was not limited to file sharing, video 
conference, distributed computing, VoIP, radio and TV 
broadcasts are other applications that became popular and 
presented the fourth generation P2P networks. Podcasts is 
one of the most famous types.  
Due to the decentralized and peer-relying nature of P2P 
networks, they are susceptible to many general attacks. 
Similar to traditional Internet, P2P networks are vulnerable 
to attacks, such as Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack, 
Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attack, Worm and 
virus propagation, Pollution attack and Man-in-the-middle 
attack. P2P networks can also be the victims of some P2P 
specific attacks. Rational attack, Index Poisoning attack, 
Sybil attack, and Eclipse attack are P2P specific attacks. 
To protect these general attacks, technologies and 
mechanisms for ensuring network safety (for example [7, 
11]) and the common network knowledge, such as 
encryption mechanisms and authentication technologies. 
Also, some well-known safety measures, such as firewalls, 
anti-virus software, and secure operating systems, provide 
the relative defensive strategies. The Man-in-the-middle 
attack is one the most pernicious attacks against P2P 
networks and may reduce the performance of these 
networks significantly [9, 14]. Simulation results in [9] 
show that this type of attack is a serious problem, and 
using only a small number of malicious nodes, it is 
possible to corrupt a very large number of requests. Man-
in-the-middle attack is an indirect intrusion, where the 
attacker inserts its node undetected between two nodes. It 
is a security threat in which such peers get between the 
receiving peer and the sending peer in a P2P network and 
sniffs the information being sent. It is typically used to 
read a public-key encrypted conversation. Gnutella, which 
is one of the largest P2P networks, is highly vulnerable to 
these kinds of attacks. The most common instance is 
modification of a Query Hit message some malicious node 
in the path from sender to receiver in Gnutella. The 
modified Query Hit directs the downloading request to a 
non-existent node or an unreliable or a malicious node. To 
best of our knowledge, there exist no direct and effective 
defense strategies against this type of attack. 
In this paper, we propose an efficient cryptographic 
algorithm that is robust against active man-in-the-middle 
  
attacks, in which —in addition to eavesdropping— the 
adversary is able to insert, delete, or arbitrarily modify 
messages sent from one user to another. Few techniques 
exist for dealing with active attacks, and designing 
practical protocols secure against such attacks remains a 
key challenge. We provide new, provably-secure protocols 
that prevent such attacks. Proofs of security are in the 
standard cryptographic model and rely on knapsack 
problem assumptions. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In the 
following section, we briefly explain some mathematical 
background and definitions. Then, in Section 3, we 
introduce our proposed cryptosystem. Performance and 
security analysis of this cryptosystem will be discussed in 
Section 4. 
2. Preliminary  
In this section, we briefly provide some mathematical 
background and security concepts and notions that are 
required to comprehend the paper. 
2.1 Mathematical Background 
The first knapsack-type public key cryptosystem (PKC) 
was introduced by Merkle and Hellman [13]. Since its 
proposal, knapsack-type PKC have been widely studied 
and many knapsack-based PKCs were developed. 
Nevertheless, almost all knapsack cryptosystems were 
shown insecure against some known attacks, such as low 
density attack [1, 3], Shamir’s attack [12], lattice basis 
reduction algorithms [8], etc. 
 
Definition1 (Subset sum problem (SSP)). A set of positive 
integers 1 2( , , , )na a a… and positive integer s is given. 
Whether there is a subset of the ia ’s that their sum equal 
to s . That is equivalent to determine whether there are 
variables {0,1}, 1ix i n∈ ≤ ≤  such that 
1
.
n
i i
i
x a s
=
=∑  
The Subset sum problem is a particular case of the 0-1 
knapsack problem. The subset sum problem has been 
proven to be NP-complete. The computational version of 
the subset sum problem is NP-hard [5]. 
Definition2 (Super-increasing sequence). The sequence
1( , , )na a… of positive integers is a super-increasing 
sequence, if 11iji ja a−=> ∑ for all 2i ≥ . 
There is an efficient greedy algorithm to solve the subset 
sum problem if the ia ’s area super-increasing sequence: 
Just subtract the largest possible value from s and repeat.  
Knapsack public-key encryption schemes are based on the 
subset sum problem, which is NP-complete [4]. The basic 
idea is to select an instance of the subset sum problem that 
is easy to solve, and then to disguise it as an instance of 
the general subset sum problem, which is hopefully 
difficult to solve. The original knapsack set can serve as 
the private key, while the transformed knapsack set serves 
as the public key. 
Definition3 (RSA problem [10]). Given an RSA public key
( , )n e , where .n p q= and , , ( 1) / 2,( 1) / 2p q p q− − are 
large prime numbers,   is an odd integer such that
gcd( , ( )) 1e nϕ = and *R nb∈ Z . Finding *na∈Z such that 
modea b n= is referred as the RSA problem. 
2.2 Man-in-the-middle attack and IND-CCA2 
Security 
The semantic security (a.k.a. indistinguishability) against 
adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA2) is the 
strongest known notion of security for the public key 
encryption schemes. This notion of security simply means 
that a cryptogram should not reveal any useful information 
about the message. This type of attack is the most 
powerful attack, which is defined by Rackoff and Simon 
[6]. In this scenario, the adversary has seen the “target” 
cryptogram before having access to the decryption oracle. 
The adversary is not allowed to ask the decryption of the 
“target” cryptogram, but can obtain the decryption of any 
relevant cryptogram (even modified ones based on the 
target cryptogram). A cryptosystem is said to be IND-
CCA2 secure if the cryptanalyst fails to obtain any partial 
information about the plaintext relevant to the “target” 
cryptogram. This notion is known to suffice for many 
applications of encryption in the presence of active 
attackers —a man-in-the-middle— including secure P2P 
transition, secure communication, auctions, voting 
schemes, and many others. Indeed, CCA security is 
commonly accepted as the security notion of choice for 
encryption schemes that are to be “plugged in” to a 
protocol running in an arbitrary setting. So, if an 
encryption algorithm in the P2P networks is secure against 
active adversary, then the malicious nodes cannot 
eavesdrop, delete, insert or arbitrarily modify messages 
sent from one user to another. Man-in-the-middle Attack is 
also called Parallel Sessions attack, because it requires two 
sessions to be running in parallel. The intruder should 
exchange messages with the first and the second victims, 
claiming to be the other party in each connection. 
  
In recent year, attempt for designing cryptosystem secure 
against adaptive chosen ciphertext is increased, but no 
efficient and secure cryptosystem in this area is 
introduced.  
Definition 5 (Public-key encryption). A public-key 
encryption scheme PKE is a triple of probabilistic 
polynomial time (PPT) algorithms ( , , )G E D  such that: 
• The randomized key generation algorithm G  takes as 
input a security parameter 1k and outputs a public key 
pk and a secret key sk . We write ( , ) (1 )← kpk sk G . 
• The randomized encryption algorithm E  takes as 
input a public key pk and a message *{0,1}m∈ , and 
outputs a ciphertext C . We write ( )pkC m←E . 
• The decryption algorithm D  takes as input a 
ciphertext C and a secret key sk . It returns a message 
*{0,1}m∈
 or the distinguished symbol⊥ . We write
( )skm C←D . 
We require that for all ( , )pk sk outputs by E , all
*{0,1}m∈ , and all C outputs by ( )pk mE  we have
( )sk C m=D . 
Definition6 (CCA security [2]). A public-key encryption 
scheme PKE is secure against adaptive chosen-ciphertext 
attacks (i.e. IND-CCA2) if the advantage of any PPT 
adversary 1 2( , )=A A A in the following game is negligible 
in the security parameter k : 
                              
$( , ) (1 )kpk sk ←G
 
                              
$
0 1 1( , ) ( )m m pk← DA  
                              
{0,1}Rb←
 
                              
$* ( , )bC pk m←E  
                              
$' *
2 ( )b C← DA  
The attacker may query a decryption oracle with a 
ciphertext C at any point during its execution, with the 
exception that 2A  may not query the decryption oracle on
*C . The decryption oracle returns ( )skm C←D .The 
attacker wins the game if '=b b and the probability of this 
event defined as Pr succA [ ] . An attacker’s advantage is 
defined to be 
        
Ind-CCA2Adv ( ) Pr[ '] 1/ 2k b b= = − < εA .            (1) 
3. The Proposed Cryptosystem 
In this section, a new cryptosystem secure against man-in-
the-middle attack will be proposed. This cryptosystem is 
based on RSA and Knapsack problems. Our scheme is a 
precoding-based algorithm that uses knapsack problem for 
performing permutation and random data padding to the message. 
3.1 Key generation algorithm  
1. Randomly choose k odd positive integers 1, , kc c… , 
where 1kc = , and ic  has ( )l i− -bits binary length for
1, ,i l i= −… .  
2. Compute 12 .ii ib c
−
= for 1, ,i k= … . 
3. Randomly choose a modulus 
1
k
ii
M b
=
> ∑ and a 
multiplier w with 0 < <w M  and gcd( , ) 1=M w .  
4. Compute . mod=i ia b w M for 1, ,i k= … .  
5. Generate two large random and distinct prime numbers
,p q  such that ( 1) / 2p − , ( 1) / 2q − be also large prime 
numbers. Compute .=n p q and ( ) ( 1).( 1)ϕ = − −n p q . 
6. Randomly choose an integer e  such that 1 ( )e nϕ< <
and gcd( ( ), ) 1n eϕ = . 
7. Use the extended Euclidean algorithm to compute the 
unique integer d , 1 ( )ϕ< <d n such that
. 1 mod ( )ϕ=e d n . 
1{( , , ), , }ka a n e… is the private key and 1{( , , ),kb b…
, , , }p q w M is the public key of the cryptosystem. 
3.2 Encryption algorithm 
To encrypt message {0,1}km∈  with k n< , the sender 
executes the following steps: 
 
1. Generate pseudorandom string 1( , , )kX x x= … with 
hamming weight h such that /v k h= be an integer. 
2. Computes m m X= ⊕ɶ  and divide 'm  into h blocks 
with equal length v 
1' ( )hm d d= … . 
3. Using pseudorandom string 1( , , )kX x x= … , performs 
a random permutation on the message blocks 
and pad some confuse data blocks to them 
such that: 
1'
1
, 1
confuse data 0
i
jj
i
x
i
i
d if x
d i k
if x
=
=

= ≤ ≤
 =
∑
. 
, 1id i h≤ ≤
  
In this case, k h−  confuse data blocks with equal length
( ) / ( )s n k k h= − −   are pad to the message blocks
, 1id i h≤ ≤ , to produce the processed message
' '
1' ( )km d d= … . 
4. Suppose y be the corresponding decimal representation 
of 'm . Compute: 
1 mod=
ec y n , 2
1
.
k
i i
i
c a x
=
=∑  
and send ciphertext 1 2( , )=c c c to the receiver. 
3.3 Decryption algorithm 
Receiver after receiving 1 2( , )=c c c , does the following 
steps to recover the plaintext m  from ciphertext
1 2( , )=c c c :   
1. Compute 1 mod=
dy c n
 
2. Compute vector X as 
1
2
1
. mod .
k
i i
i
r c w M x b−
=
= =∑ , 
1
1
1 1
.
mod 2, mod 2, 2
2
i
i i
i
i i
r x b
x r x i k
−
=
−
−
= = ≤ ≤
∑
 
Note that 1
k
iiM b=> ∑ .Thus the vector 1( , , )kX x x= … that 
demonstrates position and length of data (and confuses 
data) blocks is calculated. Compute 1ki ih x== ∑ and
( ) / ( )s n k k h= − −   . 
3. The length of data blocks is equal to 
'(| | ( ) ) /v m k h s h= − − × where '| |m is the binary 
length of y . So, the length of data (and confuses data) 
blocks and position of them are explicit, therefore the 
receiver simply can separate confuse data from 
processed message 'm  and recover mɶ . 
4. Outputs m m X= ⊕ɶ .  
4. Performance and Security Analysis 
The performance-related issues can be discussed with 
respect to the computational complexity of key generation, 
key sizes, encryption and decryption speed, and 
information rate. 
The proposed cryptosystem features fast encryption and 
decryption. The encryption only carries out one 
exponentiation, an encoding, ( )kO  XOR and additions. 
The decryption roughly needs one modular multiplication 
and one modular exponentiation. Altogether, the efficiency 
of our scheme is comparable to the classical RSA 
cryptosystem, while our construction is IND-CCA2. 
4.1 Security Analysis of proposed cryptosystem 
The security of our proposed cryptosystem is examined by 
considering known and potential attacks. The RSA 
cryptosystem is a well-studied encryption algorithm in the 
cryptology community. Security of this cryptosystem is 
based on integer-factoring problem. To date, there doesn’t 
exist a polynomial time algorithm for solving integer-
factoring problem or solving RSA problem.  The proposed 
knapsack problem is secure under known attacks, such as 
Low-density attack, Shamir’s attack, and lattice-based 
reduction algorithms [15]. 
Theorem1: The proposed cryptosystem is secure against 
adaptive chosen ciphertext attack (i.e. IND-CCA2) in the 
standard model. 
 
Proof: Suppose thatA
 
is a PPT algorithm against IND-
CCA2 security of the proposed cryptosystem. Let
* * *
1 2( , )c c c=  be the challenge ciphertext corresponding to 
the challenge message bm , {0,1}b∈ , where 
*
1 , ( )RSA n ec y< >= E and *2 1 .k i iic a x==∑ . Since a decryption 
query on the challenge ciphertext is forbidden by the 
CCA2-experiment, so if *1 1c c= , then 
*
2 2c c≠  and vice 
versa. We consider two potential cases *1 2( , )c c c=  and 
*
1 2( , )c c c=  that may be queried to decryption oracle by 
the adversaryA . Note that queried ciphertext of the form 
* *
1 1 2 2( , )c c c c c= ≠ ≠  does not reveal any useful 
information about challenge bit.   
 
Case1. In this case, the CCA2 adversary queries on the 
ciphertexts of the form *1 2( , )c c c= . For this case, the 
decryption oracle computes
Knap 2 Knap 2
* *( ) ( )X c c X= = =D D , and since *1 1c c≠ , we 
have * *
, 1 , 1( ) ( )RSA n e RSA n ey c c y< > < >= ≠ =D D . We should 
consider two possible cases: 
1) *m m=ɶ ɶ while *y y≠ . In this case the decryption oracle 
outputs * *bm m X= ⊕ɶ  and the CCA2 adversary wins the 
game. The probability that this event occur is ( )2 n k− −  that 
depends on the values of n and k . For example, for 
  
2n k= the success probability is 2 k− , which is negligible 
(note that in the decryption algorithm we assume n k>  ). 
 
2) *m m≠ɶ ɶ and *y y≠ . For such cases the decryption 
oracle outputs random string *m m X= ⊕ɶ . Hence, 
challenge bit is information theoretically hidden to CCA2 
adversary and his advantage to guessing challenge bit is 0. 
 
Hence, the overall advantage of the CCA2 adversary in 
Case1 is negligible. 
 
Case2. In this case, the CCA2 adversary queries on the 
ciphertexts of the form *1 2( , )c c c= . For this case, the 
decryption oracle computes 
Knap 2 Knap 2
* *( ) ( )X c c X= ≠ =D D , *y y= , and then pick 
up message blocks from *y  based on the bits of random 
string 1( , , )kX x x= … . So, *m m≠ɶ ɶ and the decryption 
oracle outputs random string m m X= ⊕ɶ . Therefore, 
challenge bit is information theoretically hidden to CCA2 
adversary and his advantage to guess challenge bit is 0.  
 
From Case1 and Case2, the overall advantage of the 
CCA2 adversary, i.e.  Ind-CCA2Adv ( )kA , to guess challenge 
bit is negligible, which finishes the proof. 
 
Remark1. In Case2, the adversary A  can modify 
ciphertext 2c
 
to guess challenge bit. The optimum choice 
for modifying 2c such that it becomes a legitimate 
ciphertext is that the attacker randomly chooses ia  from 
public weight 1( , , )ka a… and produce ciphertext 
*
2 2 ic c a= + and then queries it to the decryption oracle. If 
2ia c∈ , then ciphertext 2c is not a legitimate ciphertext 
and the knapsack cryptosystem outputs ⊥  (reject). If 
2ia c∉ , then 
*
2 2 ic c a= + is a legitimate ciphertext and 
the knapsack cryptosystem outputs plaintext
* *
1( , , 1, , )i kX x x x= =… … which is differ from 
* * * *
1( , , 0, , )i kX x x x= =… …  in the i-th bit. In such case we 
have * 1h h= + and picked up message blocks from *y  
based on the bits of * *1( , , 1, , )i kX x x x= =… …  contains the 
bits of challenge message. Thus, the CCA2 adversary can 
guess challenge bit from *m m X= ⊕ɶ (the output of the 
decryption algorithm).  
The probability that *2 2 ic c a= + becomes a legitimate 
ciphertext is ( 1)2 k− − which is negligible. Thus, the CCA2 
adversary’s advantage in such cases is also negligible. 
5. Conclusions 
In this paper, a cryptosystem that is robust against man-in-
the-middle attack (active adversary) is proposed. This 
cryptosystem is a probabilistic one and uses a pre-coding 
algorithm to encode input messages. We use a secure 
knapsack-based cryptosystem for performing permutations 
and random data padding to the message. We showed that 
the cryptosystem is efficient and secure against active 
adversary. Another advantage of the proposed 
cryptosystem is that one can simply implement it in both 
hardware and software. 
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